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of supervisors, board of trustees, common council, or other body .... "36 Such
inclusive language, with specific mention of "common council,"37 seems to be
indicative of a legislative intent to include the contracts of cities.
In view of the related section of the Code of Civil Procedure and the purpose
of the Public Works Act it seems clear that the legislative intent was that the
obtaining of labor and material bonds on all public contract projects be a matter
of general, statewide concern.
Conclusion
Van Loben Sels and Williams can be explained only on the basis that the
courts took the narrow view that the geographical confines and the purpose of the
municipal improvement are controlling and can exempt the improvement in every
way from the operation of State statutes. This view has been specifically overruled
in Department of Water & Power v. Inyo Chem. Co.38 where the supreme court
held that even though the subject matter of litigation is a municipal affair, if a
"state statute affects a municipal affair only incidentally in the accomplishment of
a proper objective of statewide concern, then the state law applies even as to
'autonomous' charter cities." 9 The broad public policy to protect laborers and
materialmen is a matter of legitimate general, statewide concern. The statute
implementing this policy would seem to affect municipal improvement projects
only "incidentally in the accomplishment of a proper objective of statewide concern." 40 Therefore, Van Loben Sels and Williams should be overruled.
John E. Wahl*
36 CAL. Coop Cry. Poc. § 1192.1(f). (Emphasis added.)
37

"Common Council. In American law. The lower or more numerous branch of the
legislative assembly of a city." BLAcox, LAw DICTioNARY 417 (4th ed. 1951).
38 16 Cal. 2d 744, 108 P.2d 410 (1940).

39 Id. at 754. The court cited City of Pasadena v. Charleville, 215 Cal. 384, 10

P.2d 745 (1932) which seems to have posed almost the same question as was decided in
Van Loben Sels. There were two statutes involved in Chareville. The court seems to
have used a philosophy differing from that of Van Loben Sels in its decision concerning
at least one of the statutes.
40 Ibid.

*Member, Second Year Class.

STATUTORY RAPE-DEFENSE-REASONABLE BELIEF
PROSECUTRIX HAD REACHED AGE OF CONSENT
Defendent admittedly had sexual intercourse with the victim who was but
seventeen years of age at the time of the act. Defendant was charged with statutory rape in violation of section 261, subsection 1 of the Penal Code.' He atI'"Rape is an act of sexual intercourse, accomplished with a female not the wife
of the perpetrator, under either of the following circumstances: 1. Where the female
is under the age of eighteen years... :'CAL. PEw. CODE § 261.
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tempted to defend by showing that he had in good faith a reasonable belief that
the prosecutrix was eighteen years of age or over at the time of the act. The trial
court refused to admit such testimony, and the district court of appeal affirmed
the conviction. 2 On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed by a unanimous
court. Thus, in People v. Hernandez,3 defendant's honest and reasonable belief
that the prosecutrix had reached the age of consent was a valid defense to
the crime of statutory rape and evidence to this effect was improperly excluded.
With this decision the California court stands alone among the courts which
have had this problem before them.4 The other courts which have ruled on this
question take the view, as did California prior to Hernandez,8 that statutory rape
statutes exist for the protection of the society, the family, and the young female
deemed by the various legislatures incapable of giving legal consent to illicit acts
of intercourse. And this being so, the perpetrator of this crime acts at his peril
and will not later be heard to assert that he was mistaken as to the age of his
victim and thereby guiltless of the crime charged. 6
In reaching its decision in the principal case, the court relies on sections 207
and 268 of the Penal Code. Section 20 provides that there must be a union of act
and intent in every crime. Section 26 provides that one who acts under ignorance
or mistake of fact which disproves any criminal intent is incapable of committing
a crime. Construing the above sections together the court concludes that if one
commits the act of illicit intercourse under the reasonable belief that the female
has reached the age of consent, the essential element of criminal intent is not
present. Therefore, since the legislature has made no explicit direction otherwise,
9
"acharge of statutory rape is defensible wherein a criminal intent is lacking."
0
be
one
can
readily
principal
case'
facts
of
the
Although under the particular
The 1889 amendment increased the age of consent from ten years to fourteen years,
Cal. Stat. 1889, ch. 191, § 1, at 223; in 1897 the age was increased to sixteen, Cal. Stat.
1897, ch. 139, § 1, at 201; the age of consent was increased to eighteen in 1913, Cal.
Stat. 1913, ch. 122, § 1, at 212.
2People v. Hemandez, 213 A.C.A. 794, 29 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1963).
8 61 A.C. 584, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1964).
4 That mistake as to age is not a valid defense see: Manship v. People, 99 Colo. 1,
58 P.2d 1215 (1936); Simmons v. State, 151 Fla. 778, 10 So. 2d 436 (1942); State v.
Wade, 224 N.C. 760, 32 S.E.2d 314 (1944); Reid v. State - Okla. Crim. -, 290 P.2d
775 (1955); Law v. State, 92 Okla. Crim. 444, 224 P.2d 278 (1950); Farrell v. State,
152 Tex. Crim. 488, 215 S.W.2d 625 (1948).
5 People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 46 Pac. 915 (1896). See also People v. Griffin, 117
Cal. 583,49 Pac. 711 (1897).

6See note 4 supra.

7 "In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of
act and intent, or criminal negligence." CA.. PEN. CODE § 20.
8"All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the
following classes . . . Four. Persons who committed the act or made the omission
charged under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent."
CAL.PEN. CODE § 26.
9 61 A.C. at 591, 393 P.2d at 677, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
10 At the time the act of intercourse took place the prosecutrix was seventeen years,
nine months of age. Evidence was offered to show that, prior to the act, in the presence
of defendant, prosecutrix had made statements to a police officer to the effect that she
was eighteen years of age. Evidence of a similar instance, but in a different town, was
offered and rejected as was a question concerning the age she gave to her employer.
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sympathetic with the court's decision, the reasoning employed in reaching it is
not too convincing. The court points out that "the issue raised by the rejected offer
of proof in the instant case goes -tothe culpability of the young man who acts without knowledge that an essential factual element exists and has, on the other hand, a
positive reasonable belief that it does not exist."", It points out further that the
court has moved away from the "imposition of criminal sanctions in the absence
of culpability." 12 But is there really an absence of culpability? 3 And was the
defendant's mistake of fact innocent, or guilty?
It is not within the scope of this note to extensively comment on the moral
atmosphere prevailing in today's society. However, one must question the underlying notion developed throughout the opinion in the principal case, i.e., that the
defendant's conduct would not have been blameworthy or "culpable" if the facts
were as he reasonably supposed them to be. Although fornication is not designated
as a crime in California' 4 (it is punishable by statute in a number of states15), it
is submitted that in light of prevailing moral standards such illicit sexual intercourse is not considered proper and may even be thought of as being "culpable."
The primary question to be examined, however, is the court's contention that
defendant's reasonable belief that the prosecutrix had reached the age of consent
'is a valid defense to the charge of statutory rape. In maintaining this position the
court relies heavily upon People v. Vogel, 16 where this same court held that a
good faith belief that a previous marriage had been terminated, when in fact it
had not, was a valid defense to the charge of bigamy. In Vogel, as in the principal
case, the court concludes that proper construction of section 20 and 26 of the
Penal Code requires such a result.' 7 But this rationale, while leading to a reasonable and just result in the former case, is not as acceptable when applied to the
charge of statutory rape. By examining the language used in support of the
present decision, the disparity between the two is readily observed. In the principal case the court quotes from Vogel: "'Since it is often difficult for laymen to
know when a judgment is not that of a competent court, we cannot reasonably
expect them always to have such knowledge and make them criminals if their
bona fide belief proves to be erroneous."' 18 Commenting on this proposition, the
court states: "Certainly it cannot be a greater wrong to entertain a bona fide but
erroneous belief that a valid consent to an act of sexual intercourse has been
.obtained."19 Obviously questionable due to moral considerations, 2 0 this position

1161 A.C. at 587, 393 P.2d at 675, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 363.

Ibid.
1s "Culpable. Blamable; censurable; involving the breach of a legal duty or the
,commission of a fault. The term is not necessarily equivalent to 'criminal,' for, in
present use, and notwithstanding its derivation, it implies that the act or conduct spoken
of is reprehensible or wrong but not that it involves malice or a guilty purpose.'
12

454 (4th ed. 1951).
14 People v. Hopwood, 130 Cal. App. 168, 19 P.2d 824 (1933).
15 See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 53-219 (1958); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-5801
.(1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6603 (1947); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.15 (1957).
16 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
'7 Id. at 801, 299 P.2d at 853.
18 61 A.C. at 590, 393 P.2d at 677, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
19 Ibid.
20
Does the court actually mean what it says? Is it no greater wrong to believe
that consent has been obtained to partake in illicit intercourse than it is to have a bona
:fide belief that one is free to remarry?
BLcx,LAw DicrroNAY
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does not present an acceptable analysis of the problem. It is true that a reasonable mistake of fact, honestly entertained, is generally a valid defense to a criminal
charge where, had the facts been as supposed, there would have been no offense. 2 1
But the same is not true when the mistake of fact only extends to the gravity of
the wrong.22 Defendant's mistake in the principal case was of the type which
should properly be labeled a guilty mistake of fact,23 i.e., what was done would
reasonably be considered as objectionable even if the facts had been as he supposed. What the defendant intended to do was wrongful even though the legislature in this State has not provided punishment for the particular wrong he had
in mind. It is in this state of mind where -the mens rea element (or criminal intent), which the court held was lacking, is found. However, this guilty state of
mind which provides -the mens rea element in the principal case was non-existent
in the Vogel case. There the defendant was acting under an innocent mistake of
fact, i.e., what was done (defendant remarried under the mistake of fact that his
nor objectionfirst wife had obtained a divorce) would have been neither a crime
24
able had the facts been as he reasonably supposed them to be.
Under this analysis, the proposition advanced by the court that the mistakes
of fact in the two cases were equally exculpating does not stand up. It is certainly
"agreater wrong" to entertain the belief that valid consent to having illicit intercourse has been obtained than it is for a layman to entertain a bona fide belief
that he has obtained a valid divorce decree from a competent court, when, in
fact, the court lacked proper jurisdiction.
While the full effect of the Hernandez decision remains to be seen, it seems
clear that the mistake of fact defense will be extended to similar criminal charges
unless the legislature directs otherwise. The court in the principal case expressly
overruled People v. Griffin,25 where the victim of the rape was beyond the age
of consent, but was incapable of giving legal consent because she was of unsound
mind.20 The court in Griffin held that it was no defense that the perpetrator of
the rape was not aware of his victim's mental incapacity.2 7 It is certainly conceivable that the mistake of fact defense may be succesfully instituted against
charges of violating similar statutes (e.g., the abduction statute28 ) which have
People v. Stuart, 47 Cal. 2d 167, 302 P.2d 5 (1956); People v. Brown, 74 Cal.
CanNrL LAW 826 (1957).
See PERNs, Cun,=AL LAW 832 (1957).
23 See Perkins, Alignment of Sanction with Culpable Conduct, 49 IowA L. REv.
325, 2375 (1964).
4 See PERKNs, CRMINAL LAW 826 (1957).
25 117 Cal. 583, 49 Pac. 711 (1897).
26 "Rape is an act of sexual intercourse, accomplished with a female not the wife
of the perpetrator, under either of the following circumstances. . . 2. Where -she is
incapable, through lunacy or other unsoundness of mind, whether temporary or
permanent, of giving legal consent." CAL. PEN. CoDE § 261.
27
The argument against the mistake of fact defense is even stronger in this
situation than in the case where the female is under the age of consent. Certainly if the
victim was only ten years of age it is inconceivable that a defense that defendant
believed her to be over eighteen would be accepted. But it is not so clear as to what
would result if the victim was over eighteen years of age but only had the mentality of
a ten year old.
28 "Every person who takes away any female under the age of eighteen years from
her father, mother, guardian, or other person having the legal charge of her person,
without their consent, for the purpose of prostitution is punishable by imprisonment
21

306, 2162 Pac. 1 (1887); see PmtINs,

